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Background. The development and implementation of a remediation plan for the residual arsenic trioxide
stored at the former Giant Mine site in the Canadian Northwest Territories has raised important issues
related to trust. Social and individual trust of those responsible for making decisions on risks is critically
important in community judgements on risk and the acceptability of risk management decisions. Trust is
known to be affected by value similarity and confidence in past performance, which serve as interacting
sources of cooperation in acting toward a common goal.
Objective. To explore the elements of trust associated with the development and implementation of the Giant
Mine Remediation Plan.
Design. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with eight purposively selected key informants
representing both various interested and affected parties and the two government proponents.
Results. Five primary issues related to trust were identified by the participants: (1) a historical legacy of
mistrust between the community (particularly Aboriginal peoples) and government; (2) barriers to building
trust with the federal government; (3) limited community input and control over the decision-making process;
(4) the conflicted and confounded role of the government agencies being both proponent and regulator, and
the resulting need for independent oversight; and (5) distrust of the government to commit to the perpetual
care required for the remediation option selected.
Conclusions. The dual-mode model of trust and confidence was shown to be a useful framework for
understanding the pivotal role of trust in the development of the Giant Mine Remediation Plan. Failure to
recognize issues of trust based on value dissimilarity and lack of confidence based on past performance have
resulted in a lack of cooperation characterized by delayed remediation and a prolonged and expensive
consultation process. Government recognition of the importance of trust to these issues will hopefully
improve future communication and public engagement endeavours.
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S
ocial and individual trust in decision-makers is
known to play a profound role in the effectiveness
of consultation around health and environmental
risk issues and acceptability of decisions for risk actions
(1,2). Trust in those making risk decisions is of critical
importance to the development of appropriate and
acceptable options for the management of those risks.
Effective, reciprocal risk communication has been shown
to play a major role in establishing and maintaining trust
(3). Incorporation of a fair, open process of public
participation and dialogue has been further advocated
as an important means of increasing public trust (4).
However,thenatureofthistrustisveryfragile.Asnoted
by Slovic (5), trust is not automatic, nor everlasting*it is
difficult to gain, even harder to maintain, and once lost
almost impossible to regain. It is thus easy to understand
how a postcolonial legacy of cumulative mistrust of
decision-makers, such as exists amongst many Aboriginal
peoples in Canada’s North (6), may present enormous
challenges in risk consultation and decision-making.
Using a qualitative approach, the research reported here
explored the elements of trust associated with the devel-
opment and implementation of the Giant Mine Remedia-
tion Plan in the Canadian Northwest Territories (Fig. 1),
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human health and the environment.
In recent years, the dual-mode model of trust and
confidence (7,8), which is also known as the trust,
confidence, and cooperation (TCC) model (1), has found
increasing salience asa means of understanding the role of
trust in risk communication and risk management. This
model (outlined in Fig. 2) looks at trust (based on value
similarity) and confidence (based on past performance) as
interacting sources of cooperation in acting toward a
commongoal.Thiscasestudyexaminationoftheissuesof
trust and environmental health risk communication was
situated within this conceptual framework.
Background
This research focused on risk communication and trust
surrounding the development and implementation of a
plan to remediate residual arsenic trioxide contamination
at a former gold mine. A history of Giant Mine and the
development of the remediation plan are provided in
Table 1. Various groups have been established during this
process to assist with consultation and oversight (9,10).
The Giant Mine Community Alliance (GMCA) was
established in 2003 to share information about the project
and to relay public concerns and issues about the reme-
diation. It currently includes representatives from the city
ofYellowknife,theNorthwestTerritoriesMiningHeritage
Society, the Northern Territories of Federation of Labour,
and the Yellowknife Chamber of Commerce, with the
YellowknivesDeneFirstNation(YKDFN)andtheNorth
Slave Me ´tis Alliance (NSMA) participating as observers.
The Giant Mine Advisory committee was established in
2012 to provide a forum for the Giant Mine Project Team
toengagewiththeYKDFN.AnadhocOversightWorking
Group was also struck in 2012 to explore establishing an
arm’s length committee to monitor and advise on environ-
mental aspects of the project implementation. It includes
representatives from Aboriginal Affairs and Northern
Development Canada (AANDC), the government of the
Northwest Territories (GNWT), the city of Yellowknife,
YKDFN, and Alternatives North.
Methods
This study is one component of a larger project examin-
ing the impact of risk communication activities on public
trust across three case studies involving First Nations,
Inuit, and Metis populations in Canada. The interviews
conducted for this portion of the research also formed the
Fig. 1. Location of Giant Mine (Aboriginal Affairs and North-
ern Development Canada, 2010; copy of an ofﬁcial work
published by the Government of Canada*not produced in
afﬁliation with, or with the endorsement of the government of
Canada).
Fig. 2. Dual-mode model of trust and conﬁdence (after ref. 7).
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community consultation information for the remediation
plan development and implementation process.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with pur-
posively selected key informants from November 2010 to
February 2011. Questions related to trust in the propo-
nents and in the consultation process were posed. The key
informants interviewed included representatives from
those deemed to be ‘‘interested and affected parties’’
to this issue based on the organizations and agencies
involved in the events outlined in the Background
section. This included the YKDFN, City of Yellowknife,
the GCMA (two representatives), the Native Women’s
Association of the Northwest Territories, and Alterna-
tives North. (Note: Although the NSMA was also
identified as an interested and affected party, no repre-
sentative from this organization was available during the
two interview periods.) Also interviewed were represen-
tatives of the two government proponents involved with
the development of the remediation plant: AANDC (then
INAC) and GNWT.
Theinterviewsweredigitallyrecorded(withpermission)
andtranscribedverbatim.Interviewswereinductivelycoded
using a constant-comparative and concept-development
approach (11) based on emergent themes that evolved
through the course of the research. Interpretation validity
was addressed using member checking (12), whereby all
participants were provided with the opportunity to verify
the full transcript of their interview and to view how their
specific comments would be used in the context of the full
set of themes developed from the collective results.
Ethical approval for this research was obtained from
the University of Alberta Health Research Ethics Board,
Panel B. In addition, a Northwest Territories (NWT)
Scientific Research Licence was obtained through the
Aurora Research Institute (Application #1562).
Results
Although the key informants spoke about the Giant
Mine Remediation Plan development process and im-
plementation from different perspectives, they collectively
raised several common issues related to trust, or lack
thereof, of notable significance. These are described here,
illustrated by comments representative of the discussions.
To preserve the anonymity of the interviewees, they
are identified as either a government proponent or an
interested and/or affected party.
Historical legacy of mistrust
Most interviewees (government and non-government)
talked about a general population distrust of government,
and how this puts government in a deficit position when
Table 1. A history of Giant Mine and the Giant Mine Remediation Plan development
1
Time Events
1948 1999 Gold is mined at the Giant Mine site near Yellowknife. Giant Mine is owned by several companies during this period. In
1990, Royal Oak Resources Ltd. purchases Giant Mine, and forms Royal Oak Mines Inc. In May 1992, local workers go on
strike, during which a deliberately-set explosion underground kills nine miners.
1999 Royal Oak Mines, Inc. goes into receivership. The courts transfer Giant Mine to the Government of Canada through Indian
and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC). INAC strikes an agreement with Miramar Giant Mine Ltd. to provide care and
maintenance at the site.
2005 Miramar terminates the agreement, and the Government of Canada enters into a cooperation agreement with the
Government of the Northwest Territories (GNWT) to remediate the site.
2007 A remediation plan is developed in consultation with an 11 person, independent review panel. It calls for the long-term
storage and maintenance of the 237,000 tonnes of arsenic trioxide dust using the ‘‘frozen block method,’’ whereby
designated areas around and within each of the underground chambers and stopes will be frozen and kept frozen over the
long term using thermosyphons.
This plan is submitted to the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board (MVLWB) as part of a water licence application on
October 19, 2007. The MVLWB deem the plan unlikely to be the cause of adverse environmental impact or public concern
and thus not requiring an environmental assessment (EA).
2008 The City of Yellowknife (in an unprecedented partnership with the Yellowknives Dene First Nation [YKDFN] and a local
environmental advocate) express concern about the potential environmental impacts of the remediation plan. In March
2008, the proposal is referred to the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board (MVEIRB) for EA.
2010 The Developer’s Assessment Report (DAR) documenting the EA is released in October 2010. In November 2010, INAC
makes $250,000 available to facilitate the participation of groups and individuals in the EA process. Funding is awarded to
the YKDFN, Alternatives North, and the North Slave Metis Alliance (NSMA) in January 2011.
2012 Public hearings on the EA are held on September 10 14, 2012.
1The information reported here and related documents may be found on the Mackenzie Valley Review Board Giant Mine Project Public
Registry (9) and the AANDC website (10).
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with the public:
And we distrust government so much anyways, you
know ... I mean the reason why we have this
situation is because there’s this hopeless manage-
ment regime, right? This blind eye to the mining
thing, terrible historical relationship with the Abori-
ginal people; just awful. So these people [govern-
ment] come really weighted, whether they know it or
not, right?
Interested and/or affected party
Specific reference was made by several people to the
historical legacy of distrust between First Nations people
and federal government agencies that has been reinforced
through years of colonial domination, assimilation, and
not honouring treaty obligations (13). Failure to recog-
nize this prevailing attitude, and to specifically account
for it in communications and consultations, was cited as
an explicit reason that people viewed the development of
a remediation plan from an initial position of mistrust:
There’s longstanding issues dealing with the federal
government, of course, [that] no one really can deny;
it doesn’t really matter what the issue is, whether it
be environmental or whether it be an education
issue or whether it be a residential school, the
payouts. I mean there’s a real lack of trust. And
how you build up trust with a group or with the
First Nations in this region that for so long, there’s
been a lack of trust, is a challenge, I think, and
I don’t know how you do that.
Interested and/or affected party
Participants acknowledged that they might have trust
in specific individuals, but still distrust the organization:
Like, I trust the people that work there to want to
do the right thing, but institutionally, for me this is a
broken organization. As a department called Indian
and Northern Affairs, they really don’t give a lot
of shit about Indians, you know? It’s all about
Northern Affairs, right? When it comes down to a
conflict between development or First Nations, you
can guess who loses out every time. This organiza-
tion has never done anything to protect the rights of
the people that sign treaty.
Interested and/or affected party
Much of their distrust was generated from a perceived
government emphasis on development over the environ-
ment and the welfare of those affected. This was
recognized by both the interested and/or affected parties
and the government proponents:
Historically, I think a lot of people believe that when
it comes to the environment and development or the
economy, the environment’s always been second ...
And so I think we need to turn that around and
work towards people saying, ‘‘Oh, the government’s
doing that project? Oh, good. I’ve got confidence
in them. I can rest [easy] because I know they’re
representing my interests.’’ We need to rebuild that,
because I think that’s been eroded over the years.
Government proponent
Other participants noted the inherent conflict in
wanting to trust the government to ‘‘look after them’’
and make the right decisions but not being able to trust
that they will do so responsibly based on their past
performance:
I think that the general population like myself know
they don’t know anything about this stuff, don’t
have the time to sit and analyze whether the frozen
block method is better than this other method, and
that they’re trusting the people who get paid to do
this stuff to do the job and do it right.
Interested and/or affected party
And there’re the other people that say, ‘‘Oh, my
God, it’s the government. We can’t trust them. Who
is independently going to watch this?’’
Interested and/or affected party
However, it was encouraging that the government
proponents interviewed in this study recognized the
critical importance of community trust in carrying out
their responsibilities and the need to strive to change the
inherent distrust within the community that has been
historically accumulated:
Our ability to implement this project revolves
around our ability to get the community to trust
us. I think that’s one of our biggest things that we
have to work with, is to get some trust or at least
some buy-in.
Government proponent
Barriers to building trust relationships with the
federal government
Several people mentioned the difficulty of trying to build
trust relationships with federal government representa-
tives who either do not reside in the community or who
may suddenly be re-assigned, either in terms of respon-
sibility for a specific project or to another location:
I think just go back to the idea of trust and
that people [want to know] that this person is going
to be around for a while ... Because the people
being consulted, namely the Aboriginal people in
Yellowknife or in the north, they don’t want to
waste their time informing some bureaucrat who’s
going to get on the next plane out of town and the
next time it’s probably going to be someone
different.
Interested and/or affected party
Limited input into decisions
Several people commented that the decision on the reme-
diationoptionwasmadewithoutanyconsultationorinput
Cynthia G. Jardine et al.
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quent consultation process has been perfunctory only:
Look, they’ve already made up their mind. They’re
freezing that stuff come hell or high water and they
don’t care what anybody quite frankly says at this
point. And I think that because the way that this
thing has rolled out, people quite frankly just don’t
trust them, and if you don’t have trust you’re not
going to get anywhere.
Interested and/or affected party
You know, where I lost trust in them in this process
was where, prior to making a decision about the
frozen block, there were a number of meetings and
then public displays of the various methods. [It was]
when we heard the decision with frozen block we
started doubting the evaluations of those risk
assessments, that people started calling just for an
independent evaluation of them.
Interested and/or affected party
There was also concern that the opportunities for con-
sultation had not provided people with a meaningful
‘‘voice’’ in the discussions, making it difficult to trust the
process:
Well, for me personally, I want to go away from a
process feeling even if I didn’t get my way, that at
least I had the opportunity to be heard and it was
done fairly and okay, we can agree to disagree and
let’s move on and okay, some of my stuff is in there
but maybe not everything I wanted. But that’s not
how I feel now.
Interested and/or affected party
A meeting and stuff on boards isn’t necessarily
consultation. It’s actually visiting people over time,
and a respect, a respect for those Aboriginal
governments.
Interested and/or affected party
Proponent versus regulator (need for independent
oversight)
The circumstances that made INAC (now AANDC) and
GNWT responsible for the remediation of the former
Giant Mine site puts them in the role of being both the
proponent of the remediation plan and the agencies
responsible forensuring that the remediation implementa-
tion and long-term monitoring meet government regula-
tions. A key area of distrust expressed by the interviewees
revolves around the inappropriateness of a government
agency playing the roles of both proponent and regulator
and the need for independent oversight of the project:
DIAND [Dept. of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development, now AANDC] is wearing way too
many hats on this particular job. They are the
proponent, the co-proponent. The minister is going
to sign off on the regulatory approvals. I want to
make sure that there’s some good independent
oversight because I don’t trust DIAND and I don’t
really trust GNWT to be doing the inspections.
Interested and/or affected party
There are people that would say, ‘‘How can the
government watch the government?’’*and they
have.
Interested and/or affected party
And if this site is going to exist forever, that trust
has to be there, and at this point, as far as I’m
concerned, only an independent body can do.
Interested and/or affected party
This confounded role was also recognized by the govern-
ment proponents:
So it’s a challenging role for government because of
the fact that you are both, in the eyes of the public,
general governments; the regulator and the propo-
nent as well, so that brings issues with it ...But we
do try because, of course, that goes straight to
confidence in the process on the part of the public.
So yeah, it’s challenging.
Government proponent
Perpetual care commitment?
The implementation of the frozen block method for
remediation requires that the thermosyphons be main-
tained in perpetuity. Given the transient nature of elected
governments and very visible budget cutbacks to long-
term programs in recent years, people do not trust that
government can be depended upon to provide this
commitment to perpetual care:
So, because that’s there forever, freezing it, that’s not
a solution. That is going to require perpetual care.
Somebody is going to have to be watching and
monitoring data from now until eternity to make
sure that stuff doesn’t come unfrozen. And if it does,
what do you do about it and what’s the trigger point
for actually doing something about it? Is there
somebody going to have the resources to do it five
thousand years from now? Are they going to know
what to do?
Interested and/or affected party
Discussion
The information and opinions provided by these key
informants on the Giant Mine Remediation Plan all
speak directly to the elements of general trust and general
confidence in the dual-mode model (Fig. 2) and demon-
strate how these have led to a lack of cooperation.
General trust
Under the dual-mode model of trust and confidence,
general and social trust is related to the judged similarity
in values between the interested and/or affected parties
and the government proponents. The respondents in
this study spoke to several tenets and beliefs related to
commonly-held human, moral, and justice values that
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of the Giant Mine Remediation Plan and, therefore,
influenced the sense of trust they had in government
decision makers.
First and foremost, there was a generally expressed
feeling that government values resource development and
the economy over the protection of the environment and
the well-being of people, particularly of First Nations.
This is contrary to a deeply-held value that protecting the
health of Canadians should be paramount in government
decision making*a belief that is espoused by Health
Canada in its primary objective to ‘‘prevent and reduce
risks to individual health and the overall environment by
working with others in a manner that fosters the trust of
Canadians’’ (14). Valuing both health and environment
also relates directly to a traditional holistic worldview of
First Nations people that everything is connected, and
the health of the environment and the health of their
people are thereby inextricably linked (15).
Government acting as both the proponent and
regulator in the Giant Mine remediation planning and
implementation violates values related to organizational
justice (fairness of process) and procedural justice
(control over the process). This conflicted dual govern-
ment role has contributed to people questioning the
integrity of the chosen remediation plan and the
regulatory process governing its approval and imple-
mentation. Feelings of injustice have been reinforced by
government resistance to the implementation of inde-
pendent oversight.
The non-proponent respondents also felt that values
related to democratic decision-making have been ignored
in this process. People do not think they were adequately
consulted on making the ‘‘right’’decision for remediation
of the Giant Mine site, and that they have subsequently
not been given an opportunity to have a meaningful
‘‘voice’’ in assessing the potential environmental impact
of the frozen block method. Lack of voice is equated to
lack of empowerment and lack of control over decisions
that directly affect peoples’ health and well-being, thus
circumventing yet a further deeply held value in a
democratic society (16).
Interestingly, people seemed able to separate their trust
in individuals from their social trust of government,
speaking to their valuation of personal integrity and
commitment over bureaucratic actions. However, build-
ing trust relations with specific members of government
has been challenged by non-continuity and regular turn-
over of responsible staff*a pattern that is even more
problematic in the North than elsewhere in Canada.
Consequently, there is a general wariness that the
individuals who have earned trust with the public will
continue to be involved in the project and that promises
of perpetual care of the site will be honoured.
General confidence
Government’s past performance, particularly with Abori-
ginal people in the North, has greatly impacted the
confidence people have in government agencies to make
good decisions. ‘‘No Canadian acquainted with the
policies of domination and assimilation wonders why
Aboriginal people distrust the good intentions of non-
Aboriginal people and their governments today (17).’’
The dissonance in values leading to a lack of social trust,
much of which is linked to past performance, further
contributes to a lack of confidence that government has
made (or will make) appropriate decisions and that they
will responsibly implement the remediation plan.
Cooperation
The distrust and lack of confidence in the government
proponents have resulted in a lack of cooperation on
furthering the Giant Mine Remediation Plan. The im-
plementation of a remedial process has been delayed by
several years, meaning that the arsenic trioxide currently
stored in the underground stopes continues to leach into
the surrounding environment. The ensuing consultation
related to the environmental assessment has been much
more prolonged and expensive than would have probably
occurred if confidence and trust in government was higher
and if the original communication around the remedia-
tion planning had been based on a more dialogic model.
However, somewhat ironically, the resistance to coop-
eration resulting from a lack of trust and confidence has
led to a better recognition on the part of the federal
government of the importance of improved dialogue and
consultation. This has been specifically acknowledged
through the recent availability of participation funding
and the creation of new consultation groups. The govern-
ment proponents interviewed in this study admitted that
they need to reassess their assumptions of their overall
role in developing and implementing remediation plans;
they cannot successfully undertake this responsibility
without better transparency of process, development of
meaningful dialogue with those affected, and without
sharing of decision-making power. In the short term, their
willingness to explore means for further cooperation, if
coupled with accountability and consistency in actions,
may allow them to move forward with the remediation
plans as trust and confidence are being rebuilt.
Conclusions
Trust has, and continues to play, a pivotal role in the
development and implementation of the Giant Mine
Remediation Plan. The recognition of the circumstances
that have led to this lackof trust, and the resulting actions
to rectify this situation, will hopefully lead to a resolution
of this issue that is more acceptable to everyone involved.
Perhaps even more importantly, this sometimes pain-
ful process has provided a road map for future such
Cynthia G. Jardine et al.
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gained from implementing a process of more transparent
risk communications based on a meaningful participatory
process that entails truly giving people an opportunity
for their concerns and opinions to be heard and to be
considered in the decision-making process. It has also
emphasized the value of paying attention to the goal of
building and maintaining trust in risk communication.
Based on the constructs of trust expressed by those
interviewed in this study, the dual-mode model of trust
and confidence appears to provide a useful framework for
understanding social trust accompanying resource devel-
opment and remediation. However, this was a single
study involving a limited number of participants. Exam-
ining issues of trust, confidence, and cooperation in other
similar circumstances and with other populations is
required to fully assess the appropriateness of this model
for this increasingly important issue in the circumpolar
north.
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